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01-27-26 victor
| carib, i dont think that sanchez has even sent the gibraltar deal to other parties for review. |
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01-27-26 carib
Actually, my only interest in spanish politics, right now, is to see no fuss with the ratification of the UK/EU treaty on Gibraltar, which fortunately does not need spanish cortes to vote on it.
I would expect the next spanish government to be conservative led.. but it's not easy anyway. |
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01-27-26 carib
IMHO 1,20 US$/€ would be "fair value, right now.
Obviously, actual FX can overshoot either side. |
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01-27-26 pillz
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01-27-26 victor
EU, India clinch 'mother of all deals' in rebuff to Trump
The signing of a deal after years of stop-go talks reflects the fallout from Trump's aggressive trade policy.
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01-27-26 victor
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01-27-26 victor
| pana, my op: we are not needy, we are not sick, so every day is xmas. with or without gold at 8k. |
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01-27-26 panasonic
| Vic, I don't care who wins, we can find other stuff to celebrate, maybe when gold goes to 8k ;-) |
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01-27-26 victor
| pana, no celebrations on my behalf :-) |
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01-27-26 panasonic
| Vic, may you be right to celebrate! Cheers!! |
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01-27-26 victor
pana, Sanchez has more lives than a cat
//
after next general elections, it should become obvious that he does not.
he was simply unscrupulous enough to get rid of all the critics in the PSOE, so nobody would question his staying in office for 4 years, without getting anything done.
in 2023 he knew quite well that nothing, or almost nothing would pass congress, and he didn't care.
he conned his voters, and continues conning them, by promising them stuff that he knows will not pass congress. |
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01-27-26 panasonic
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01-27-26 panasonic
Carib, in UK head of Gov. is referred as Prime Minister, not the case in Spain.
That said, why are we discussing Spain??? Let's talk Mag7, Metals, Veni, shipping cos. ;-)
The only thing I said, Sanchez has more lives than a cat, don't have further to add abt. Spanish politics. |
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01-27-26 victor
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01-27-26 carib
Sanchez is presedente del gobierno (prime minister), named by the king, not directly elected.
No party in Spain is likely to have an absolute majority, so coalitions are required..
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01-27-26 panasonic
Carib, some lunatics consider Sanchez "president" wow!!
https://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/lang/en/presidente/news/paginas/2023/20231116_investiture-session.aspx |
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01-27-26 panasonic
| Carib, ah wow didn't know, now I can sleep better knowing that the king can throw Sanchez to the lions :-)) |
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01-27-26 carib
Panas: last time I checked, Spain was ruled nominally by a King.
No presidential elections there, so far..
;~) |
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01-27-26 panasonic
Vic, yep of course, that sentiment is all over EU, not unique to Spain.
Presidential elections are won by very small margins, so Sanchez can and will exploit to the max, and PP will have little flexibility on certain subjects. |
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01-27-26 victor
pana, i dont think that dt is the main reason why people are going to vote for or against sanchez.
abascal makes a nice summary of what's at stake.
and it's a direct consequence of miriam's NO-to-everything since 2023.
//
january 22nd.
"¡Aquí no funciona nada!, ¡Ni las carreteras, ni los trenes, ni los hospitales, ni la educación!...
https://x.com/vox_es/status/2014422071791559137 |
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01-27-26 victor
pana, distance with DT would be a good strategy for PP?
//
given nato, it's a necessary strategy for all parties: vox, pp, psoe, etc.
some more than others. but you can't expect any of them to get too close to dt, after greenland and nato.
so what sanchez is doing, anti-dt, isn't unique.
it's simply that the other guys are not in office, while sanchez is fighting for his own survival. |
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01-27-26 panasonic
Vic, yes...distance with DT would be a good strategy for PP?
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01-27-26 victor
| pana, ayuso-PP is friendly with milei, keeps mute on dt. |
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01-27-26 victor
pana, vox is openly friendly with dt and milei.
but given dt's stance on nato, vox has had to distance themselves from dt, just like other far-right parties.
as for the pp, they once said that they are indifferent to whoever wins the white house, that they have good relations with both parties, but probably prefer for Democrats to win. |
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01-27-26 victor
pana, you dont remember but back in 2023, after the elections, psoe people were telling sanchez:
"call new elections, don't deal with miriam, the price is too high to pay"
yet sanchez refused to call new elections, and sold himself to miriam. |
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01-27-26 panasonic
Vic, me not trying to get inside Spanish politics "mess", my point is simple, PP is the one in a difficult position.
My question to you, which strategy would work best for PP, mark distance from DT or not? |
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01-27-26 victor
pana, the fact that sanchez insists so much on finishing his term, is because he figures he's going to lose.
last time, in 2023, he thought mistakenly he would win, and called early elections. and that's how he ends up in miriam's claws. |
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01-27-26 victor
pana, PSOE stance is clear
?/
if things were clear, sanchez would call early elections instead of dealing with the ridicule that miriam puts him through, whenever they have to vote for whatever.
last one is an omnibus, with increase in pensions, which sanchez wanted to pass tomorrow tuesday, but miriam already announced it's a NO. |
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01-27-26 panasonic
| We'll have to wait for general elections, PSOE stance is clear, PP strategy yet to be seen. |
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01-27-26 victor
pana, we'll see.
please answer my question. |
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01-27-26 panasonic
| Vic, Muslims (30 million all over EU + UK btw) won't put their skin at risk, they will run to "neutral" places, so your theory that Spain can stay neutral is imho part of the dream exposed by Rutte... |
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01-27-26 victor
pana, Sanchez will stay strong imho, only thing he needs is opposing DT for a smooth ride.
//
why didnt this strategy work in extremadura?
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01-27-26 victor
pana, they are not going to fight any war
i have no idea what you are talking about. |
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01-27-26 victor
pana, yes, ive heard it too. so??
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01-27-26 panasonic
| Yep, but they are not going to fight any war, they will run to the neutral idiot. |
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01-27-26 panasonic
No Vic, on the contrary...Spain kicked Muslims out! They had balls at that time.
Today outside Alhambra or Cordoba's Mesquite you can check, they are back!
I spoke with many (between falafel sandwiches), msg was same everywhere "hermano, todo esto volvera a ser territorio musulman" |
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01-27-26 victor
| pana, btw, countries like france, uk, germany, russia have a much larger muslim population than spain. |
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01-27-26 victor
pana, in times of "neutrality" Muslims were not invading EU.
//
seriously?? did you forget already that spain was muslim so many years ago? :-)))
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01-27-26 panasonic
Vic, in times of "neutrality" Muslims were not invading EU.
Sanchez may say what he wants, there is no neutrality in the silent invasion from ME, Spain can play neutral till all the muslims from EU move there, under the same excuse of staying neutral, not the best outcome for Spain, me think. |
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01-26-26 victor
pana, have you watched big brother?
one of the best strategies is to have one or more shields, and hide behind these shields.
then you are not considered a threat, and all these big targets are eliminated way before anyone ever thinks of eliminating you.
spain is an expert at playing big brother. :-))
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01-26-26 victor
pana, i agree with rutte.
the thing is: russia would not attack spain.
look at history: spain did not participate in either world war.
the only large country in europe that did not intervene in either conflict, i think.
the same would happen if russia invades the baltics or poland.
spain makes a pledge of neutrality, and then it's in everyone's main interest in keeping spain neutral. :-)
i mean, if franco could deal with a pretty mean guy like hitler, keeping him away from invading spain, in spite of franco breaking all his promises to hitler- and getting away with it, i am sure X future leader of spain can do the same with putin.
and the uk and france would go along with a neutral spain, considering the alternative. |
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01-26-26 panasonic
Vic, this one is between you and me, pls don't share with Pedro:
NATO chief says Europe should ‘keep on dreaming’ if it thinks it can defend itself without the US.
https://www.cnn.com/2026/01/26/europe/nato-chief-rutte-european-defense-us-intl |
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01-26-26 carib
| The current irony is Trump getting in trouble with the NRA, after his aides said one should not carry a gun when going to a demonstration.. |
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01-26-26 carib
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01-26-26 spal
| Carib - put that way - sounds good to me also. |
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01-26-26 panasonic
| Vic, Sanchez will stay strong imho, only thing he needs is opposing DT for a smooth ride. |
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01-26-26 panasonic
| Carib, gates are closing on Iran. |
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01-26-26 carib
| USS Lincoln strike group now in ME waters. |
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01-26-26 carib
| My personal preference is several options, with freedom of choice. |
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01-26-26 spal
| Personal preference is fewer solutions and solutioners. |
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01-26-26 carib
blaming and "questioning" is indeed very easy. Solving.. much harder.
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01-26-26 carib
SPAL: a century ago.. people started "questioning " the "belle epoque" and got something worse for a few decades.
The global order can certainly be altered, for better or for worse.
I would prefer for better.
In the USA, I am an outside observer, and as such I observe radical polarisation, which is bad. |
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01-26-26 victor
pana, the unpredictability of vox.. this is extremadura, a region.
vox refuses to even meet with the pp.
now imagine what vox is capable of doing after next general election. in terms of uncertainty, etc.
//
PP y Vox sigue sin mantener contacto en Extremadura y se culpan entre sí de la falta de acuerdo
Tras la constitución de la Asamblea, hace prácticamente una semana, ambas formaciones siguen sin reunirse con las negociaciones en punto muerto y lejos de llegar a buen puerto
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01-26-26 spal
Carib - if I am correct both of your scenarios indicate wrong direction ... e.g. an abysss (and then a reversal) ... but first directionally to an abyss.
And civil war.
Certainly the direction (and some of the assumptions) over the past 40-50 years is being questioned. That is clear. |
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01-26-26 carib
| When in doubt, get out—if you don’t want to be in a civil war or a war, you should get out while the getting is good. |
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01-26-26 carib
I see two different scenarios..
1) looking into the abyss make people opt for reasonable solutions, and then the precious metals spike proves just to be such.
2) we really head for deep shit in the US (disruption, civil violence, etc) and then gold becomes the main safe haven, and keeps getting pricier. But in that case, better holding it abroad, in a safe, in bars form.
Ray Dalio, FWIW, thinks we are getting closer to the brink. |
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01-26-26 spal
Century Aluminum, Emirates Global Aluminium to Build First New US Primary Aluminum Plant Since 1980
07:44 AM CST, January 26, 2026
-- Century Aluminum (CENX) and Emirates Global Aluminium said Monday that they have agreed to build the first new primary aluminum production plant in the US since 1980.
Under the agreement, Emirates Global will own 60% of the joint venture, while Century will own the remaining 40%.
The plant, to be located in Inola, Oklahoma, is expected to produce 750,000 tonnes of aluminum annually. It will also create 1,000 permanent jobs and 4,000 jobs during construction.
The companies said construction is expected to start by the end of the year and production is set to begin by the end of the decade.
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Command economy and friends brought over the wall ... |
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01-26-26 spal
| Stops tightened under all positions |
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01-26-26 savo
Nonsense is our speciality
:-)))) |
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01-26-26 spal
UURAF
UCORE RARE METALS IN
Processing in US ... added |
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01-26-26 spal
what do you think can hapen to precious metals?
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Nonsense is our speciality ... |
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01-26-26 spal
ARMN
ARIS MNG CORP
Adding
These are the days of miracle and wonder
This is the long distance call |
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01-26-26 savo
| spal ... if Trump and all his nonsense were to be ejected... what do you think can hapen to precious metals? |
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01-26-26 spal
| Silver approaching 10% up on the day |
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01-26-26 spal
| AU ... anglogold ashanti ... delivering |
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01-26-26 spal
| TGB ... in ordit ... those holding (it may still go higher) |
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01-26-26 panasonic
| FCX big volume in calls Feb.20th Strike 65$, trimmed. |
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01-26-26 spal
ARMN
ARIS MNG CORP
Gold (some copper and silver)
Political Risk ... Colombia
But world class producer - world class management |
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01-26-26 spal
COPJ
SPROTT JUNIOR COPPER MINERS ETF
53.15 (+9.32%)
Premarket - today
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01-26-26 spal
US Critical Mineral Stockpile Bill for $2.5billion Introduced
Authored by GoldFix
GFN – WASHINGTON: A bipartisan group of U.S. lawmakers has introduced legislation to establish a $2.5 billion Strategic Resilience Reserve for critical minerals, aiming to stabilize prices, support domestic mining and refining, and reduce U.S. dependence on China-dominated supply chains. |
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01-26-26 spal
| Ali Moshiri, Chevron's former head for Africa and Latin America who is now CEO of Houston-based Amos Global Energy, has been preparing for years to enter Venezuela and has been in early-stage talks to raise as much as $2 billion. |
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01-26-26 spal
HOUSTON, Jan 26 (Reuters) - In a downtown Houston bar, Matthew Goitia, a director at Pelorus Terminals, lays out his early idea to refurbish and build marine terminals that can blend and export crude and ship chemical products in Venezuela.
The ambitious plan he estimates would cost $250 million to $1 billion requires him to refurbish an existing crude oil marine terminal in Venezuela ...
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/us-oil-capital-houston-buzzes-111221828.html
Play is services |
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01-26-26 spal
| Savo - in terms of sector funds for copper I like COPJ very much. On big animals RIO is being pulled up by its tilt to copper. Concerning small amimals TGB may run more. I like HBM also. |
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01-26-26 savo
spal.. how would you pay cooper?
COPX or COPP for the miners...
CPER for the mineral... but it is not the physical... they do future contracts... so they lose money in the roll over..
anything else? |
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01-26-26 leopardo
| Gold and Silver all The rest is blablabla |
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01-26-26 spal
| BREAKING: Gold futures officially rise above $5,100/oz for the first time in history. |
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01-26-26 spal
Tin futures went limit up in China
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01-26-26 spal
China is buying everything physical: silver +13.8%, platinum +10.6%, tin +8.6%, palladium +8.8%.
Strategic stockpiling across the commodity complex. |
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01-26-26 spal
🇨🇳Precious metals hit record high again. Shanghai #silver jumped 13.8% in China on Monday, #tin +8.6%, #gold +3.7%. Guangzhou #platinum +10.6%, #palladium +8.8%. #Lithium carbonate +6%.
Shanghai #nickel +3.2%, #copper +2.7%, #aluminum +1.3%, #zinc +0.8%.
INE crude oil jumps 2.9%, Freight Index +4.9%. #OOTT
#IronOre +0.4%, #steel rebars +0.7%. +0.4%, #steel rebars +0.7%.
#CHINA #COMMODITY $XAGUSD $XAG $SLV $XAUUSD $XAU $GLD $XPD $XPDUSD $XPT $XPTUSD
Chickity China, the Chinese chicken
You have a drumstick and your brain stops tickin' |
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01-26-26 spal
Schpal's list of junior gold miners with the highest torque to Gold price where risk-adjusted upside is tested for minimal dilution (as you will see a lot of equity and other securities being dropped into the market by many operators):
1. K92
2. Wesdome
3. Aris
4. IAMGOLD
5. Fortuna
This is explicity a (now) late-cycle gold move - these still have valuation gaps + margin expansion + delayed recognition converge.
Current hold only K92 ... but may trade the others around. |
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01-26-26 spal
| And when these trends turn (as they will) they will be savage on the downside ... miners will get killed. Be agressive, be quick and manage risk ... |
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01-26-26 spal
Savo - ok, but personally that time frame has many complete reptures in the configuration of the economy. We are talking comparing making horse shoes to 2 nanometer transistors.
I think the comparisons to the 80's are more in scope. Mostly 3/4's of the silver production goes to industrial uses. This will ultimately determine its value. It has limited investment value, but this is hyped (approaching mania, but still with some gas in the can) right now. Paper silver greatly exceeds physical etc.
Comex can kill this rise if needed. I think the mania runs 12 months or so max. I think it can go somewhat higher in the meantime. As can gold. As can copper. I have positions, but I trail stops. |
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01-26-26 savo
Venezuela Investors Are Facing A Legal Minefield as US Recalibrates Stance
By Bloomberg News
January 23, 2026 at 6:40 PM GMT+1
Investors who want to take part in the White House’s plans to revitalize Venezuela’s oil-based economy are at risk of stepping into a political and legal minefield over diplomatic recognition.
Acting President Delcy Rodríguez is not officially recognized by the US and other countries as Venezuela’s rightful authority. Instead, that distinction still belongs — at least on paper — to members of the opposition-led legislature who were elected more than a decade ago.
This recognition status, seemingly at odds with President Donald Trump’s full-throated endorsement of Rodríguez, means that companies would face off in US court against lawyers working for opposition politicians largely living in exile, in the event of any legal disputes over their investments. And any contracts signed with Venezuelan state-owned entities — including the national oil company — could get torn up by a future government intent on challenging Rodríguez’s constitutional standing and legitimacy.
What’s more, US courts hearing cases involving billions of dollars in disputed Venezuelan assets follow the American government’s official diplomatic stance, so the opposition still represents the country in ongoing legal battles against scores of jilted creditors, arbitration claimants and other plaintiffs, as it has for years.
“The concern here is if in 10 days, Delcy Rodríguez is no longer acting president, we have someone like González come in and González says, ‘Hey, we’re not going to honor any of those contracts that you just signed because they weren’t signed by a legitimate representative of the Venezuelan government,’” said Ingrid Brunk, chair of international law at Vanderbilt Law School, referring to Edmundo González, the exiled retired diplomat who is widely considered the rightful winner of Venezuela’s contested 2024 presidential election, based on an independent vote tally.
Until the US addresses this recognition issue, Venezuela is unlikely to attract desperately needed long-term investment, as companies shy away from agreements that would be difficult to enforce in the US, one of many risks they are weighing in a country once known as a stable, prosperous democracy, legal experts say. Creditors won’t be able to restructure unpaid debts. And for the Rodríguez administration, access to billions of dollars in Venezuelan assets abroad, including frozen bank accounts, gold reserves in the Bank of England and Special Drawing Rights at the International Monetary Fund, will remain elusive.
The recognition lag is growing more conspicuous as Venezuela’s new leadership moves swiftly to roll back decades of state-led legislation to draw back investors. Among the proposed reforms is a provision to allow for international arbitration of contract disputes, a measure that would help to restore investor confidence by avoiding Venezuela’s politicized court system. But in the US, the measure could not be implemented until the US recognizes the Rodríguez government.
Even in recent days, US recognition “has been explicit and repeatedly reaffirmed” in “statements of interest filed by the US government in US courts,” said Dinorah Figuera, president of the opposition-led parallel assembly who is now based in Spain.
In response to a request for comment on the recognition issue, a State Department spokesperson said the Trump administration “continues to work with the interim authorities to stabilize Venezuela” in a three-part plan outlined by Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
The roots of the conundrum date back to 2019, when the first Trump administration imposed oil sanctions on Venezuela and withdrew recognition of strongman Nicolás Maduro in favor of then-National Assembly head Juan Guaidó, who declared himself the country’s legitimate president based on a constitutional provision. The US shut its embassy in Caracas and Venezuelan diplomats withdrew from Washington.
Scores of other countries followed suit on the US stance. Although Guaidó was in Caracas at the time, most of his parallel administration was living abroad or eventually fled, often rubbing shoulders in Congress and influential think tanks in the US capital. As government harassment grew, Guaidó would later leave too.
In that period, the emboldened parallel administration set up ad-hoc boards of exiles to oversee international assets owned by Venezuela’s state-run Petróleos de Venezuela SA and the central bank. These boards remain active in US courts. Critically, the first Trump administration granted the parallel administration access to more than $300 million in frozen Venezuelan Central Bank funds in the US banking system.
The most visible of these parallel entities is PDVSA’s ad-hoc board, which represents the company in a years-long court battle over the shares in Houston-based refiner Citgo Petroleum Corp., Venezuela’s most valuable overseas holding. A court-ordered auction of the shares is close to reaching a final outcome.
Neither PDVSA ad-hoc board chair Horacio Medina nor the board’s press contact could be reached for comment.
The lack of clarity about formal recognition is part of a wider constellation of risks that will probably keep most oil companies away from Venezuela for now, said Luis Pacheco, who served as the first chair of PDVSA’s ad-hoc board from April 2019 to December 2020.
“Don’t you think companies that are going to sink billions of dollars in Venezuela are going to think about this? This is not a risk that can be measured,” Pacheco said. “If you want to do a deal, you would not only need a US license but also a compliance test.”
One court in New York handling a claim on Venezuelan assets has now requested that the US present a filing to clarify its position on recognition, with a Feb. 11 deadline.
US President Donald Trump, center left, speaks during a meeting with oil executives in the East Room of the White House in Washington on Jan. 9.Photographer: Jim Lo Scalzo/EPA/Bloomberg
“The way to solve this is to recognize Delcy, but that’s a very premature move,” said José Ignacio Hernández, senior specialist at consultancy Aurora Macro Strategies and the parallel administration’s former attorney general.
The thorny issue is among many facing oil companies as they weigh Trump’s push to reinvigorate Venezuela’s oil industry. Citing current legal and commercial frameworks in Venezuela, Exxon Mobil Corp. Chief Executive Officer Darren Woods has described Venezuela as “uninvestable.”
On Jan. 5, the same day that Rodríguez was sworn in as Nicolás Maduro’s successor in Caracas, Venezuela’s opposition-led National Assembly elected in 2015 — which former President Joe Biden said was the country’s last democratically elected body — renewed its leadership for another year. Their original term expired in 2021, but the opposition has repeatedly extended the mandates of its lawmakers, initially to preserve the former interim government structure.
The parallel authorities can also hinder efforts to gain access to other assets. For years, Venezuela’s central bank has been trying to recover gold stored in the Bank of England’s vaults in London as part of the country’s foreign reserves.
British courts, following UK recognition policy, blocked Maduro’s attempts to repatriate or sell the gold, ruling that the Bank of England could rely on instructions aligned with UK foreign policy, which had recognized Guaidó’s authority at key points in the litigation. Since then, the case has ricocheted through appeals, with courts repeatedly denying access to the central bank in Caracas.
For now, relations between US and Venezuela are rapidly thawing, even though Trump’s backing for the “very, very smart” leadership in Caracas hasn’t yet translated into recognition of the new administration as the country’s legitimate representative. Further muddying the outlook, Trump has said he likes opposition leader María Corina Machado “a lot,” and wants her to be involved “somehow.”
As Rodríguez consolidates power, the US is airing out its embassy in the Venezuelan capital in anticipation of a reopening. Venezuelan diplomats are cautiously doing the same in Washington.
“It’s unusual to have assisted someone to come into power and then not recognize them,” said Vanderbilt Law’s Brunk. “You still have just dramatic political instability and the mere recognition is not going to really fully solve that problem for the oil companies.
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01-26-26 savo
good example of how phenomenally undervalued silver is...
if it goes back to 1:15 as in the days of the US independence...
it would mean 330 silver... but of course gold will go up too...
for a 10k gold... silver would be 660.
Given the tenant in the WH and the crony soon to arrive at the fed.. i would say it is a reasonable target.
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01-26-26 pillz
Six key questions about Venezuela's potential debt restructuring: analysis from a think tank of bankers
Sun Jan 25 16:52:22 2026 EDT
Political changes in Venezuela have reignited hopes for a restructuring of Venezuelan debt, prompting a sharp rebound in defaulted bonds. Market estimates put the country's external public debt at over $160 billion, well above the figures reported. US-based asset managers hold most of the defaulted bonds, making their participation critical to any agreement.
The Institute of International Finance (IIF), which represents major banks, funds, and insurance companies, released an extensive article answering six key questions.
Debt size and main creditors
1) What is the size of Venezuela's external public debt and who are the main creditors?
Official data on Venezuela's external debt is outdated and is considered to underestimate the true size and composition of liabilities. While figures from the World Bank and IMF Joint External Debt Center put external debt at around $42.8 billion in 2024, the latest official estimates from the Bank of Canada and Bank of England's Sovereign Default Database suggest that Venezuela's defaulted debt reached $96 billion in 2024. Market-based estimates for the outstanding public external debt are significantly higher, ranging from $150 billion to $195 billion.
More recent estimates from Transparencia Venezuela (a Venezuelan non-governmental organization dedicated to preventing, investigating, and exposing corruption in the country) provide some clarity, placing the outstanding external debt balance at over $164 billion at the end of 2024. Outstanding bonds, including sovereign and PDVSA bonds, account for approximately 58% of the total. Sovereign and PDVSA bonds are held by US-based asset managers, followed by Luxembourg-based asset managers, with around 15%.
Venezuela has no debt with the IMF. Official bilateral and multilateral creditors account for about 18% of Venezuela's defaulted debt, and China accounts for about 10%.
2) What are Venezuela's main infrastructure investment needs, and to what extent might meeting them require external financing, including from private external creditors?
Venezuela's most urgent infrastructure investment needs are concentrated in the oil sector, which is critical to any short-term economic recovery. While economic diversification will be important over time, oil remains the fastest and most scalable source of public revenue, foreign exchange, and financing for reconstruction. In fact, the macroeconomic outlook and political stability will depend on the restoration of oil production capacity. Given depleted international reserves, extremely limited fiscal space, and large external debt, meeting these investment needs will require substantial external financing, including from private creditors.
Venezuela has one of the world's largest hydrocarbon reserves, including extra-heavy oil, mature conventional fields, and natural gas. Current estimates suggest that oil production could increase to 2.5-3 million barrels per day over the next decade. This would require sustained investment of between $10 billion and $12 billion annually, more than $100 billion in total. The recovery is likely to be gradual.
The return of the IMF?
3) Would a conventional restructuring, backed by the IMF and involving all creditors, face particular complexities or longer timeframes?
Venezuela has not received a formal IMF mission since 2004, and no standard Article IV consultation has been conducted since then. Furthermore, the IMF has had no official contact with Venezuela since 2019. While the IMF’s role would be crucial—and the Fund could, in principle, move quickly to expand its engagement following a formal request backed by its members—the severe lack of data would almost certainly slow the process. These constraints would add time for IMF staff to prepare a prior Debt Sustainability Analysis (DSA), assess the full scope of required financing guarantees, and ultimately lay the groundwork for a possible debt restructuring in the future.
Any IMF-backed process involving official creditors would likely seek to bring together Paris Club and non-Paris Club creditors. Given Venezuela’s unique geopolitical context and its importance in the broader strategic competition between the United States and China, reaching consensus among official creditors could take considerable time and may not yield immediate results.
4) Could a sequential approach to engagement with creditors, potentially starting with private creditors, offer a more pragmatic path?
There are precedents for sovereign debt restructurings with private creditors outside of a formal IMF lending program, suggesting that a sequential approach starting with private creditors could be viable in Venezuela's case.
• Argentina (2020) restructured its private bond debt without an IMF-backed financing agreement, instead resorting to negotiations based on the IMF’s debt sustainability analysis, with the Fund playing only a limited role in technical assistance.
• Belize (2017) completed a private sector restructuring without an IMF financing package or a formal IMF Debt Sustainability Agreement (DSA).
• A similar approach was seen in the Republic of Chad (2018), where an agreement was reached with private creditors without the involvement of official creditors.
Precedents for debt restructuring
5) Are there lessons from past and current debt restructuring cases that can help inform considerations for Venezuela?
Iraq, Puerto Rico, and Lebanon are widely cited as cases comparable to Venezuela, but each presents important differences.
Iraq's post-2003 restructuring was made possible by exceptional circumstances, including significant debt cancellations for official and commercial creditors, backed by UN Security Council measures. Private sector claims were relatively small, representing approximately 15% of total external debt, and extraordinary legal and political mechanisms helped neutralize holdouts.
These conditions do not apply to Venezuela. Private creditors account for a much larger share of Venezuela's debt, and given the current geopolitical dynamics, support for a UN-backed statutory approach similar to that in Iraq seems highly unlikely.
Consequently, the Iraq precedent offers limited practical guidance for Venezuela. Lebanon's still-unresolved restructuring following its 2020 default underscores the importance of domestic political stability and policy consistency. Prolonged political uncertainty has significantly delayed progress. A similar risk could arise in Venezuela if there is no clear perception that an interim government has the authority to negotiate with creditors or issue new debt. Legal continuity is essential for successful renegotiation: future governments should not be able to invalidate a restructuring or newly issued obligations.
6) To what extent could US policy measures, including executive orders, influence the pace or design of a future Venezuelan debt restructuring?
Recent US policy measures, particularly the January 9 executive order, offer preliminary indications of the Trump administration's emerging approach to Venezuelan debt restructuring. The order sets out guiding principles governing commercial transactions involving Venezuelan oil, including measures designed to protect oil-related cash flows from creditor embargoes. While the immediate focus is on safeguarding oil revenues and facilitating the renewal of investment by oil companies, the order also appears designed to limit litigation risks during a potential debt restructuring process. |
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01-26-26 spal
K92 - 2026 production: 190,000 oz gold, 12.7 million lbs copper, 361,000 oz silver (equivalent to 225,000 oz AuEq at base metal prices).
Feasible Share Price if Gold Rises from $5,000 to $6,000/oz in 12–15 MonthsA +20% gold rise to $6,000/oz is plausible in a supercycle (e.g., per Bank of America's forecast), driven by supply shortages and demand.
This would boost 2026 EPS by 23% to ~$3.02 (via ~1.1x leverage on the gold portion). Current valuation (8.3x forward P/E) could expand 20–30% to 10–12x in a bull market, reflecting improved sentiment and growth visibility.
Conservative (constant P/E 8–9x): Share price ~$25–$27 (25–35% upside from ~$20), pure EPS-driven.
Moderate (P/E to 10x): Share price ~$30 (50% upside), with modest re-rating.
Optimistic (P/E to 12x, full bull): Share price ~$36 (80% upside), if K92 hits run-rate production and attracts premium multiples (e.g., IDP NPV5% extrapolates to ~$3–$4 billion at $6,000, trading at 0.7–1.0x NPV).
A feasible target is $28–$32, assuming gradual ramp (gold averaging ~$5,500), no disruptions, and market favoring growers (historical rallies saw similar miners gain 50–100%).
This implies 40–60% upside from current levels, with torque from expansions.
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