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03-18-26 ruspan
Spal: "03-17-26 spal
20 million barrels per day, or approximately
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I respectively disagree.
The world was in a c.4 million surplus before this started. And the Saudis can raise production right now by 3-4 million BOED with off take in the the Red Sea and delivery via Suez.
Also prices would have to be c.$190 per barrel to get close to the 1970's oil shock.
No the main pressure is on China and Asia and they will negotiate soon."
Of course, this is not my data and I am not an expert and spent very few time to look into the issue - but the guy is a very competent one, and I think his argument on this crisis, that it is just started to develop and most likely will get worse by the end of april is valid:
-The damage to the infrastructure is not finished, increases every day.
-We are running on the previously extracted and shipped oil plus the reserves right now
-There are few arguments for Iran to stop right now, whatever the Chinese might think about it.
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03-18-26 victor
| pana, it was good, but the best game by far was vz-japan, in my op. |
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03-18-26 panasonic
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03-17-26 panasonic
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03-17-26 panasonic
| "Mojtaba" very busy sex life lately! |
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03-17-26 panasonic
"still nothing about our bonds"
:-(( |
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03-17-26 savo
Silver’s Endgame: Almost Too Obvious
By Matthew Piepenburg
Partner
March 15, 2026
The case for silver is now almost too obvious.
Silver’s Fat Pitch
Like many Americans, I grew up playing a fair amount of baseball. Part of this involved trying to hit a little round ball with the equivalent of a modified, wooden stick.
Like asset prices and market forces, this little white ball, thrown by a pitcher 60 feet away, could sink, curve or speed by you in bewildering and often embarrassing ways.
Sometimes, however, we hitters of that ball would be blessed with what is called a “fat pitch”—that is, a ball thrown so comfortably straight, clear and trackable that it was effectively impossible to miss.
Below, I’ll show why the set-up we are currently seeing in the global silver market is precisely that: A fat pitch.
Prior Silver Curve Balls
Of course, silver markets, like baseball players, have also seen a lot of curve balls and crazy swings.
We saw recent versions of this in December of 2025, when the COMEX price-fixers, with a little help from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, or CME, raised margin prices to force a mass-selloff (i.e. price-fall) of the metal.
When that pitch failed, the COMEX threw another, far more effective margin hike (or “curve ball”) in late January of 2026 to openly engineer the single-worst silver price crash in 44 years.
The reasons for these tricky pitches at the COMEX were obvious. The big players (i.e., banks) going net-short silver were literally dying under the weight of silver’s rising price moves.
Not so coincidently, the CME/COMEX then initiated another, more effective, margin hike and thereby bailed the insider banks out of the mother of all short-squeezes.
There was no price discovery, but blatant price manipulation, as fixed/rigged as the 1919 World Series. (Ironically, both the CME and the cheating, 1919 White Sox hailed from Chicago…)
But as I argued in January, such a rigged game was nothing new. The COMEX has been playing it for decades, from defeating the Hunt Brothers’ silver bid in the 1980’s (with a sell-only trick) to crushing the “Reddit mob’s” attempt to bring honest demand (and pricing) to silver in 2021.
In short, the COMEX, and the banks who effectively self-regulate it, threw a lot of curve balls which were difficult to beat.
But as we enter the 2026 macro playing field, it is the COMEX itself which is about to strike out, and this bodes extremely well for silver.
Here’s why.
Silver: About to Hit a Homerun
The set-up for silver is now nothing short of extraordinary. In fact, it is unprecedented.
At 30,000 feet, the big picture remains the same. That is, as currencies are debased to monetize unsustainable sovereign debt levels, monetary metals like silver outshine dying paper currencies.
It’s really that simple.
But the more nuanced, and often misunderstood, tailwinds for silver are a bit more complicated, though entirely clear once you know where to look.
And the first place to look is at the COMEX itself, where silver (like gold) has been manipulated downwards for decades. We’ve covered the motives, means and symptoms of this COMEX price fix in greater detail elsewhere.
What is worth noting here, however, is critical. That is, once the physical silver leaves the COMEX, the artificial price-fixing charade ends, and silver naturally rips higher.
Paper Claims vs. Physical Demand
Traditionally, for example, paper claims on silver (and gold) never resulted in actual delivery out of the COMEX. Instead, the contracts were simply rolled over or cash-settled.
But those days are ending.
As of this writing, there are more paper claims (“open interest) on the COMEX silver exchange than there are actual ounces of “registered” silver to meet delivery. In fact, there’s only about 80 million ounces on hand to meet over 570 million ounces of delivery demand.
That’s a levered mismatch of 7:1 at the COMEX.
If we then consider the larger silver market itself, including ETF silver, derivative claims, futures contracts, etc., many analysts in the commodity space are quoting the number of paper silver claims to actual silver ounces at a ratio of 350:1.
Read that last line again.
No Chairs Left
If one were to think of the paper silver market as a game of musical chairs in which the “music” represents the actual amount of physical silver available and the “chairs” represents the number of paper claims on it, the supply & demand ratios above make it mathematically clear that once the music stops, there’ll be very chairs left standing with silver.
Or stated more simply, percolating physical silver demand is about to hit a supply shock, which means silver is poised to skyrocket.
And if you look at the COMEX silver flows, you’ll quickly discover that the music is slowing down.
January applications for silver deliveries at the COMEX, for example, came in at 40M ounces, which was 40X the normal delivery rate.
A more recent delivery took 20% off the COMEX inventory in a week. (I have no proof, but I’m guessing the buyer here was JP Morgan…)
Looming Delivery Failure
At this exit pace, it’s at least plausible that the COMEX could see a bald failure of physical delivery within 90 days.
In such an event, the COMEX silver trade would be reduced to a cash-only trade, a possibility I warned of in January.
But this, of course, would only happen if one assumed the COMEX wouldn’t declare some kind of emergency in the interim, which we can be almost sure they will…
Nevertheless, the screws are now undeniably tightening on this New York exchange in ways we’ve never seen before.
This classic mismatch of supply and demand in the silver space is unprecedented, and whether the price-fixers in New York like it or not, supply and demand forces still matter, and they can be powerful forces…
Supply Deficits Colliding with Rising Demand
For example, and as most silver investors know, this metal has seen five consecutive years of supply deficits at 200M ounces/year, now aggregating to a deficit of nearly 1 billion ounces. China’s recent export restrictions for silver, moreover, aren’t helping supply flows.
Meanwhile, in the silver future’s market, we are seeing backwardation, a fancy way of saying that current prices are higher than future prices, which is a screaming signal of high demand colliding with low supply.
These factors help explain why the current lease rate for silver is at 8% levels, whereas for the bulk of my entire investing career, the lease rate had never surpassed 1%– until now.
Combine such evidence of a supply shock with silver’s rising industrial demand (60% of silver’s demand is industrial) in everything from solar panels to the missiles now cris-crossing Middle Eastern skies, and we see all the makings of a historical price hike in the metal.
After all, the silver supply can’t be magically increased with just the touch of a button. 70% of silver production comes as a byproduct of other mining.
This means there’s no silver supply miracle on the horizon.
And Then There’s War…
What IS filling our horizon, however, is the fog of war and hence the fog of oil. Supply shocks matter to oil just as much as they do to any asset, including silver.
As crude oil rises thanks to tightening flows in the Strait of Hormuz, so does inflation, and for every $10.00 rise in oil, we see a 0.1% rise in even our otherwise openly bogus inflation scale.
And as inflation rises, as it will, the monetary profile of silver just gets another tailwind as an anti-fiat metal.
Back to Baseball
Which brings me back to my original point and metaphor.
When one combines silver’s monetary profile with its rising industrial demand in a backdrop of historical supply deficits, COMEX delivery failures, rising lease prices, futures market backwardation, and all that is inherently backward as to war and rising oil, we arrive at what comes to nothing more than an unprecedented “fat pitch” for silver.
Batter up. |
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03-17-26 savo
| still nothing about our bonds... |
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03-17-26 carib
| Lea más: (EE.UU. aliviará sanciones a Venezuela para liberar más petróleo por la guerra con Irán) https://www.bloomberglinea.com/latinoamerica/venezuela/eeuu-aliviara-sanciones-a-venezuela-para-liberar-mas-petroleo-por-la-guerra-con-iran/ |
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03-17-26 carib
| AMPX stock closed above 19$... |
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03-17-26 carib
A number of sources told The Jerusalem Post that if President Donald Trump decides to launch a military operation to take control of the Strait of Hormuz – an operation intended to ensure freedom of navigation – it could significantly prolong the war “by weeks, if not months.”
“This could extend the war by as much as two months,” one source familiar with the discussions said. |
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03-17-26 carib
Spal: indeed, if the war ends relatively fast (say be May)
oil is likely to be cheap again by summer. |
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03-17-26 spal
It is moot in my opinion Carib as I think that the price per barrel will be sub $80 by then.
If not $5 a gallon is a bad look. |
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03-17-26 carib
SPAL: what dollar price per gallon would significantly impact midterm elections outcome, in your opinion?
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03-17-26 spal
c.$190 per barrel to get close to the 1970's oil shock.
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Inflation adjusted ... as Dr. Savo requires ... |
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03-17-26 spal
20 million barrels per day, or approximately
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I respectively disagree.
The world was in a c.4 million surplus before this started. And the Saudis can raise production right now by 3-4 million BOED with off take in the the Red Sea and delivery via Suez.
Also prices would have to be c.$190 per barrel to get close to the 1970's oil shock.
No the main pressure is on China and Asia and they will negotiate soon. |
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03-17-26 carib
"Las noticias de hoy sobre el traslado a Rusia del líder supremo de la revolución para su tratamiento médico son una nueva guerra psicológica. El líder iraní no tiene por qué huir y esconderse en refugios. Su lugar está en las calles junto a su pueblo", escribió en ruso en su cuenta de X el embajador iraní en Moscú, Kazem Jalali.
point is Mojtaba has never been seen in public since the Feb 28th... |
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03-17-26 carib
Kuwait arrests 16-member Hezbollah terror cell, seizes weapons, drones, Morse code transmitters
Kuwaiti authorities arrested 14 Kuwaiti citizens and two Lebanese nationals belonging to a Hezbollah cell, seizing weapons, narcotics, and terror paraphernalia. |
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03-17-26 carib
| Victor: is he alive and conscious? |
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03-17-26 ruspan
On the scale of the energy crisis
High energy prices could linger for several years, based on the experience of previous energy crises, but there are too many unknown parameters and unique characteristics to allow for the imposition of energy crisis patterns.
Regarding the current energy crisis, it's important to understand that, in addition to the uncertainty surrounding the blocking of transit/outgoing traffic from the Persian Gulf:
First, it's unknown how much production will remain after all this carnage in the Middle East. Physical damage to infrastructure and technological degradation after wells are frozen must be taken into account.
Second, the war could drag on, as the US is not demonstrating sufficient military superiority to solve a very specific military objective—ensuring outgoing traffic from the region and protecting critical infrastructure from drones and missiles. There is no other military objective at this time, as all other goals are derived from the overall objective—the functioning of trade flows in the region.
If we consider the decline in average annual oil supply, there have only been two examples in world history: 1974, where the average annual supply fell by 4.9%, or 2.86 million barrels per day (not instantly, but on average over the year).
And then there was the protracted oil crisis, the impetus for which began in 1979-1981 but continued until 1985.
In 1974, the market structure bore little resemblance to today's—there were no strategic reserves or oil futures market. Therefore, it's best to focus on 1979-1981, where price action began in 1979, but the market only experienced real shortages in 1980, a 4.7% y/y decline (-3.13 million b/d), 1981 (-5.5%) y/y or (-3.45 million b/d), 1982 (-3.8%) y/y or (-2.26 million b/d), and then in 1983 (-1.1%) y/y or (-0.65 million b/d).
In 1984, the market stabilized with production growing by 1.8% y/y, and in 1985, a decline of 0.5% y/y returned, with full-fledged production recovery beginning in 1986.
How did prices react? 1978 – $12.9 per barrel on average per year, 1979 – $32.1, 1980 – $37.9, 1981 – $36.7, 1982 – $33.4, 1983 – $29.8, 1984 – $28.8, 1985 – $27.3.
The maximum average monthly price was in November 1979 – $42 per barrel. The average annual peak was in 1980 (an increase of almost three times from the 1978 baseline) and then a gradual decline, but prices remained high until 1985, followed by a collapse from 1986 to 1990 – an average of $18.
Oil supply recovered to 1979 levels only by 1994, i.e., The oil crisis, with varying intensity, lasted for almost 15 years, so supply shocks of this magnitude are a long-term phenomenon.
As for the Middle East, from a peak production of about 22.2 million b/d in 1976-1979, production fell to 10.6 million b/d by 1985 (more than doubled), recovering only by 1998, and only beginning to consistently exceed the levels of the late 1970s in 2004! A crisis spanning an entire era.
The oil crisis of the early 1980s was not a monthly or annual event, but a nearly six-year period of market stress.
It turns out that during the four years of severe crisis, global production lost 9.5 million b/d, or 14.3%, which amounts to… attention… 3.5 billion barrels of undelivered oil flow over four years from the 1979 baseline. For comparison, current strategic reserves are approximately 1.2 billion barrels.
Currently, formal losses are estimated at 20-21 million b/d, but in reality, they are closer to 15-16 million b/d, as up to 2-3 million b/d will be quickly diverted through pipelines in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and another 2 million b/d will be diverted to China and India in the current configuration.
This is precisely why the supply gap is important not at the moment, but rather over time. In March 2026, approximately 500 million barrels could be withdrawn from the market if things continue as they are now. In April, it will be closer to 400-430 million barrels.
In the current configuration, the system's safety margin lasts until May; after that, extraordinary measures will need to be taken to forcibly limit oil consumption – this is the system that managed to balance the market in the early 1980s.
We'll see how things play out this time. |
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03-17-26 ruspan
The Largest Energy Crises in History
If we evaluate the largest energy crises by the decline in global oil supply, the breakdown is roughly as follows:
▪️The Arab Oil Embargo (Yom Kippur War) of 1973-1974, which reduced oil supply by 4.3-5 million barrels per day, or 7.5-8.6% of global supply. Market reaction: from $3 to $11.65, or +289%.
The crisis lasted approximately six months, from October 1973 to March 1974; recovery took 6-9 months.
The crisis was exacerbated by the fact that there was virtually no spare capacity outside the Middle East.
▪️The Iranian Revolution in 1979-1980 led to a decline in oil supply by 5-5.6 million barrels per day, which at the time represented 7.6-8.5% of global oil supply. However, the market reaction was more limited, with an increase from $14 to $39.5, or +182%.
The crisis lasted 12-18 months (a sharp decline from late 1978, a low in spring 1979, and a partial recovery by 1980). Iran restored production to ~3.2 million barrels per day by mid-1979, but then the Iran-Iraq War brought it down again.
▪️The Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1981 led to a supply decline of 3.7-4.1 million barrels per day (Iran ~1.5 million barrels per day + Iraq ~2.2-2.6 million barrels per day), approximately 5.7-6.3% of global supply. The market reaction was minimal due to the high base of the previous crisis, resulting in an approximately 11% increase to the peak of $40 in November 1980.
Production in both countries remained depressed for 3-4 years. Iraqi production partially recovered by 1983, and Iranian production by 1982.
▪️The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait/Gulf War of 1990-1991 led to a supply decline of 4.3-4.6 million barrels per day, or 6.5-6.9% of global supply. Prices rose 141% from $17 in July 1990 to $41 in October 1990.
The crisis lasted approximately 9 months (August 1990 – April 1991), with the Kuwaiti fires extinguished until November 1991.
Kuwait took 12–18 months to fully restore production, while Iraq was under sanctions, with production remaining suppressed until 2003.
▪️US sanctions on Iran and Venezuela in 2018–2019 reduced supply by 3.5–4 million barrels per day (Iran ~2.0–2.2 million barrels per day + Venezuela ~1.5–1.8 million barrels per day), accounting for 3.5–4% of global supply. The market responded with a 30% price increase from $66 in April 1990 to $86 in October 1991.
The production decline was uneven, with a gradual increase over ~12-18 months. Iran saw a sharp decline after sanctions, while Venezuela experienced a chronic decline.
▪️The largest strike in Venezuela in 2002-2003 resulted in a production decline of 2.6-2.8 million barrels per day (from ~3.1 to ~0.3-0.5 million barrels per day), accounting for 3.3-3.5% of global supply. Prices rose 42% from $26 in November 2002 to $37 in February 2003.
The crisis lasted ~2-3 months during the acute phase (December 2002 – February 2003); partial recovery occurred within 6 months.
▪️The Iraq War in its initial phase in 2003 led to a production decline of 2-2.3 million barrels per day, accounting for 2.5-2.9% of global supply. The market reaction was limited (+12%) due to hedging geopolitical risks before the operation.
The crisis lasted approximately 3-6 months, with a complete halt in exports; a gradual recovery occurred by the end of 2003. Iraqi production only returned to pre-war levels (~2.5 million barrels per day) by 2005-2006.
▪️Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Gulf of Mexico) in 2005, which led to a production decline of 1.5-1.7 million barrels per day – approximately 1.8-2.0% of global production – and prices rose by 17%.
Some infrastructure was restored within weeks, while others were lost forever. 6 months to recovery of ~80%, some platforms – up to 12 months, refineries – 2-6 months.
▪️The Arab Spring and the Libyan war in 2011 led to a production decline of 1.5-1.6 million barrels per day, or approximately 1.7-1.8% of global production, while prices rose by 31%.
Major loss: ~8 months (February – October 2011): partial recovery by the end of 2011, repeated declines in 2013-2014. Production fluctuated between 0.2 and 1.4 million barrels per day from 2011 to 2020 due to the ongoing conflict.
Therefore, the current 20 million barrels per day, or approximately 19% of global production (realistically, about 15-16% due to the redirection of flows through oil pipelines plus the passage of some ships in the interests of China and India), is almost 2.5 times more severe than the largest energy crises in history – the oil embargo of 1973-1974 and the revolution in Iran of 1979-1980. |
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03-17-26 spal
The Iran Crisis: De-Escalation Incoming — And Why Oil Prices Are the Real Story.
The Middle East just hit its “face-off” moment, but the script is already flipping. The joint U.S.-Israel campaign (Operations *Epic Fury* and *Roaring Lion*) is now entering its third week. Since February 28, we’ve seen unprecedented kinetic strikes: Iranian drones hitting Dubai International Airport (DXB) fuel tanks and the Fujairah Oil Industry Zone, while Tehran continues routing nearly 90% of its crude to China.
Yet, this isn't a slide into World War III. It is a transition into a calculated de-escalation where **China** is forced to play the reluctant referee.
The Enforcer Nobody Saw Coming
For years, Beijing played “predatory neutrality”—extracting cheap Iranian oil and supplying dual-use components while letting the U.S. foot the security bill for the Gulf. That era ended when the U.S. achieved hemispheric energy independence. Now, Iran’s survival sits squarely on China’s balance sheet.
Tehran needs Beijing’s sanctions-evasion network and cash too desperately to burn its only major buyer. Expect frantic back-channel diplomacy via Oman. China will demand restraint to protect its **Belt and Road** investments in Dubai and Saudi Arabia; in return, Iran will dial back Gulf attacks.
The Timeline: Look for the acute phase to wind down in 4–8 weeks (late April to mid-May 2026).
The Recovery: Full Gulf traffic and Dubai operations should begin a fragile recovery by summer.
The Asymmetric Oil Reality
Oil prices are no longer a global equalizer; they are a strategic lever. Brent spiked to **$120** earlier this month, but the premium is already cooling.
The Forecast: Once a truce lands, prices will likely ease toward **$75–$85** by Q3 2026 as Saudi spare capacity and surging U.S./Venezuelan output stabilize the market.
* **The Pain Gap:** America remains largely insulated as a net exporter, while China and Asia bear the full weight of inflation and forced diversification costs.
The Strategic Burden-Shift
This is textbook burden-shifting. Washington has forced its rival to choose: abandon a disruptive client or spend political capital stabilizing the very sea lanes China needs to survive. Either way, Chinese resources are diverted from the Indo-Pacific to manage a Middle Eastern headache.
The Bottom Line:
The era of the U.S. as the "sole Gulf cop" is over. We are entering a multipolar Gulf where the U.S. perfects its **“veto from above”**—precision strikes with zero ground troops—while handing the "neighborhood watch" bill to its main competitor.
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03-17-26 victor
carib, apparently this guy in in charge:
//
Exclusive: Iran's new supreme leader rejects de-escalation proposals conveyed by intermediaries, Iran official says
March 17 (Reuters) - Iran's new supreme leader has rejected de-escalation proposals conveyed to Tehran by intermediaries, demanding Israel and the United States first be "brought to their knees", a senior Iranian official said on Tuesday.
Ayatollah Mojtaba Khamenei had held his first foreign policy session since being named supreme leader, and had taken a stance for revenge against the U.S. and Israel that was “very tough and serious”, the official said, without clarifying whether the leader attended in person or remotely.
The senior official, who asked not to be identified, said two intermediary countries had conveyed proposals to Iran's Foreign Ministry for "reducing tensions or ceasefire with the United States". The official did not give further details of the proposals or the intermediaries.
The supreme leader had responded that it was not "the right time for peace until the United States and Israel are brought to their knees, accept defeat, and pay compensation."
The supreme leader has the final say in all matters of state in the Islamic Republic. No new images have been released of him since his selection over a week ago by a clerical assembly to replace his father, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Some Iranian officials have said he was lightly injured in the strikes that killed his father. U.S. officials have suggested he suffered severe injuries.
The U.S.-Israeli war on Iran is in its third week with at least 2,000 people dead and no end in sight. The Strait of Hormuz remains largely closed off, with U.S. allies rebuffing U.S. President Donald Trump's request for help to reopen the critical waterway, raising energy prices and fears of inflation.
In his first public message since selected, which was read out by a state TV broadcaster last week, the new supreme leader said the Strait of Hormuz should remain closed as a tool of pressure on "Iran's enemies".
Three sources told Reuters on March 14 that Trump's administration had rebuffed efforts by Middle Eastern allies to start diplomatic negotiations aimed at ending the Iran war.
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03-17-26 panasonic
I wonder if there is unlimited supply of barbudos ready to give their lives?
Some rumors that USA and Iran are holding talks already, pressure from Gulf States on Russia and China has to be extremely high right now. |
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03-17-26 panasonic
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03-17-26 carib
| Who is calling the shots now in Iran? |
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03-17-26 victor
| The IDF also confirmed it had assassinated the head of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Basij paramilitary militia, Gholamreza Soleimani, and his deputy, Seyyed Karishi. |
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03-17-26 victor
| Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz has said Ali Larijani, Iran’s top security leader, was killed Monday night. Iran has yet to confirm Larijani’s alleged killing. |
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03-17-26 victor
| ruspan, apply that to russia :-)) |
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03-17-26 ruspan
Another mentally sick US President :-(
What a bad luck, ultimately. |
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03-17-26 victor
:-))
Wow! Venezuela defeated Italy tonight, 4-2, in the WBC (Baseball!) Semifinal. They are looking really great. Good things are happening to Venezuela lately! I wonder what this magic is all about? STATEHOOD, #51, ANYONE? President DONALD J. TRUMP
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03-17-26 pillz
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